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INTRODUCTION 
More than ever before, the U.S. justice system is under pressure to 
provide competent language interpretation.  The U.S. Census Bureau 
reported that, as of 2010, approximately forty million foreign-born 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2014; B.A., Carleton 
College, 2007. 
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individuals reside in the United States,1 an increase of approximately nine 
million over the same population ten years earlier.2  Of those forty million 
residents, approximately one in ten spoke no English, while approximately 
two in ten did not speak English well.3  Also in 2010, the federal courts saw 
a 13.8% increase in the number of annual interpretation events at the district 
court level,4 where the court must provide interpreters for all criminal cases 
and civil cases brought by the United States.5  Over one-third of those 
interpretation events took place in the Ninth Circuit, an area bordering 
Mexico and more impacted by nonnative speakers than the majority of the 
country.6 
This need for language interpretation in our justice system is growing 
alongside an uncertainty about the right to confrontation.  The Supreme 
Court in Crawford v. Washington has labeled as “testimonial” some types 
of out-of-court statements, ruling that they are no longer admissible in 
criminal cases without the opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine 
the declarant.7  Examples of testimonial statements traditionally include 
forensic reports, statements made to establish facts, and statements made 
during police interrogation.8  Powering the modern understanding of the 
Confrontation Clause9 is the Framers’ fear that testimony not subjected to 
 
1 ELIZABETH M. GRIECO ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ACS-19, THE FOREIGN-BORN 
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 2 tbl.1 (2012), available at 
http://goo.gl/9MDGDt. 
2 See NOLAN MALONE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION: 
2000, at 1 (2003), available at http://goo.gl/x5MQo6. 
3 GRIECO ET AL., supra note 1, at 15 fig.12. 
4 Interpreting: An Every-Day Event in Federal Courts, THE THIRD BRANCH (May 2011), 
http://goo.gl/SE8abR. 
5 See 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d) (2006). 
6 See Interpreting: An Every-Day Event in Federal Courts, supra note 4. 
7 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).  A “declarant” is the source of the original statement.  FED. R. 
EVID. 801(b). 
8 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310–14 (2009); Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 51–56; see also John R. Grimm, Note, A Wavering Bright Line: How Crawford v. 
Washington Denies Defendants a Consistent Confrontation Right, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
185, 196 (2011). 
9 The Confrontation Clause, embedded within the Sixth Amendment, gives each criminal 
defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  U.S. CONST. amend. 
VI.  For scholarship regarding Crawford’s effect and the boundaries of testimonial 
statements broadly, see, for example, Michael D. Cicchini, Dead Again: The Latest Demise 
of the Confrontation Clause, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (2011); Brooks Holland, Crawford 
& Beyond: How Far Have We Traveled from Roberts After All?, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 517 
(2012); Grimm, supra note 8, at 196–97. 
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“the crucible of cross-examination” may unjustly prejudice a court against a 
criminal defendant who should have the right to face his accuser.10 
In its 2012 opinion in United States v. Orm Hieng, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals recognized a tricky issue regarding one of those types of 
testimonial statements—statements made during police interrogation.11  The 
court was faced with an instance in which a police officer testified about 
statements made during the interrogation of a defendant who required the 
use of an interpreter.12  The trial court granted a motion to exclude 
witnesses from the courtroom but allowed the interpreter who assisted in his 
police interrogation to remain.13  By doing so, the court implicitly ruled that 
the interpreter was “not a percipient or fact witness.”14  On appeal, the 
defendant argued that the interpreter’s statements could not be admitted as 
evidence if the defendant was refused the opportunity to face the 
interpreter.15  One can imagine that the Framers’ fear, which generated the 
Confrontation Clause, is especially felt by non-English speaking 
defendants, who cannot gain firsthand knowledge of either the statements 
their interpreters relay to their questioners during police interrogation or the 
statements to which the police officers testify at trial.  However, the 
majority of the Ninth Circuit panel, relying on its analysis in United States 
v. Nazemian,16 found that, so long as the interpreter in question acted as a 
mere language conduit, the defendant himself was the declarant of the 
statements, and he therefore had no constitutional right to confront his 
interpreter.17 
In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Berzon challenged the 
validity of Nazemian’s language conduit test.18  First, Judge Berzon 
questioned the “unity between hearsay concepts and Confrontation Clause 
analysis” on which the Nazemian holding was founded.19  Second, Judge 
Berzon pointed out dissonance between Nazemian’s holding and the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in both Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico.20  Based on those two considerations, Judge 
 
10 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
11 See United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012). 
12 Id. at 1136–37. 
13 Id. at 1137. 
14 Id. at 1139. 
15 Id. at 1138–39. 
16 948 F.2d 522, 528 (9th Cir. 1991). 
17 Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1138–41. 
18 See id. at 1149 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
19 Id. 
20 See id.  See generally Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
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Berzon was unwilling to accept silently the majority’s Confrontation Clause 
analysis. 
The purpose of this Comment is to question Nazemian’s continued 
validity based on the two criticisms offered by Judge Berzon’s concurrence 
in Orm Hieng.  Part I describes the process by which Nazemian’s language 
conduit test has allowed the admissibility of statements made through an 
interpreter during police interrogation.  Part II outlines the current state of 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence based on several recent Supreme Court 
opinions.  Finally, Part III considers both the majority and concurring 
analysis of the confrontation issue in Orm Hieng, referencing the evolving 
Confrontation Clause doctrine and the development of that doctrine in the 
area of forensic report admissibility.  By comparing Confrontation Clause 
doctrine regarding forensic reports to the issue in Orm Hieng, this 
Comment argues that the purpose of police interrogation, the practical 
effect of confrontation, and the irrelevance of any perceived quality of 
witnesses suggest that police interpreters should be subject to confrontation.  
Interpreter confrontation is relevant in a country where over three million 
people cannot understand English and where interpreters are used 350,000 
times each year in its courts.21  The issue of Nazemian’s continued 
application may reemerge in en banc review of a future case. 
 
I. MIRANDA, NAZEMIAN, AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF POLICE INTERPRETERS’ 
STATEMENTS 
A. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA AND POLICE INTERROGATION THROUGH 
INTERPRETERS 
A suspect of a criminal investigation has the right to refuse to answer 
questions during custodial interrogation by police.22  Miranda v. Arizona 
 
21 GRIECO ET AL., supra note 1, at 15 fig.12; Interpreting: An Every-Day Event in 
Federal Courts, supra note 4. 
22 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The 
Miranda Court defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way.”  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  This Comment is limited to cases in 
which police interrogation has not violated a defendant’s Miranda rights such that the only 
relevant admissibility questions are hearsay and confrontation.  For discussion of Miranda 
issues as they relate specifically to non-English speakers and interpreters, see Floralynn 
Einesman, Confessions and Culture: The Interaction of Miranda and Diversity, 90 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1999); Richard Rogers et al., Spanish Translations of Miranda Warnings 
and the Totality of the Circumstances, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 61 (2009); Alison R. Perez, 
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guaranteed that right to criminal suspects by requiring that police employ 
specific safeguards before beginning a custodial interrogation: a warning 
that the suspect has a right to remain silent; a warning that any statement 
the suspect makes may be used against that suspect in court; and a 
disclosure that the suspect has a right to a retained or appointed attorney.23  
Only upon a waiver of those rights made “voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently” may police obtain statements admissible in court.24 
Once a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to 
remain silent is made, statements made during interrogation can be used as 
evidence against that suspect at trial.25  Typically, the interrogating police 
officer enters such evidence as testimony.26  This is the case even when the 
interrogation requires an interpreter.27  However, this method of providing 
evidence creates a hearsay problem when an interpreter is required.  The 
Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a person’s oral assertion, 
written assertion, or nonverbal conduct . . . intended . . . as an assertion” 
made outside of the current tribunal and offered to prove that the assertion 
is true.28  Unless such a statement is excluded from or falls within an 
exception to the hearsay rule, it is inadmissible in court.29 
One exclusion from the hearsay rule provides that a statement made by 
a party and offered against that party at trial is not hearsay.30  Based on that 
exclusion, statements made by a criminal defendant during police 
interrogation are not hearsay because those statements were made by the 
defendant and are offered against the defendant at trial.31  When an 
interpreter is used in the process of the interrogation, however, the police 
officer acting as a witness at trial does not testify about the defendant’s 
statements—he testifies about the interpreter’s statements.  In that instance, 
the hearsay exclusion that allows testimony about statements made during 
police interrogation may or may not apply. 
 
Note, Understanding Miranda: Interpreter Rights During Interrogation for Spanish-Speaking 
Suspects in Iowa, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 603 (2009). 
23 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 See David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 455, 469 (1999); see also 23 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts §§ 10–17 (2012). 
27 See, e.g., United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2012). 
28 FED. R. EVID. 801(a), (c). 
29 FED. R. EVID. 802. 
30 See id. 801(d)(2)(A). 
31 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 725 F.2d 462, 466–67 (8th Cir. 1984). 
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Prior to 2004, there was room to argue that the hearsay problem 
created a Confrontation Clause issue as well.32  Before the Supreme Court 
altered the Confrontation Clause doctrine with its opinion in Crawford, the 
Court interpreted the Confrontation Clause to give criminal defendants the 
right to confront any declarant making statements against them by cross-
examining that declarant at trial, unless the statements made by that 
declarant showed “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” or fell 
within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception.”33  Because no hearsay exception 
applied to an interpreter’s statements, courts were left with the ambiguous 
question of whether the interpreter’s statements showed particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.  It was this area of ambiguity that the Ninth 
Circuit attempted to resolve with its opinion in United States v. Nazemian.34 
B. NAZEMIAN’S SOLUTION TO THE HEARSAY/CONFRONTATION 
PROBLEM 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Nazemian attempted to clarify the 
question of whether statements made by interpreters in police interrogations 
qualify as hearsay and are subject to the Confrontation Clause.35  The 
defendant in Nazemian was charged with conspiracy to possess heroin with 
intent to distribute, among other charges.36  The defendant argued that 
statements he made to a DEA agent were inadmissible hearsay and that 
admitting the statements violated the Confrontation Clause because a third-
party interpreter, who did not testify at trial, translated the statements.37 
The Ninth Circuit panel identified a threshold question that controlled 
both the Confrontation Clause analysis and hearsay analysis: Should the 
statements in question be attributed to the interpreter or to the defendant?38  
If the defendant were treated as the declarant, the statements would fit into 
the same hearsay exclusion as noninterpreted statements during police 
investigation.39  Likewise, the Confrontation Clause problem would vanish; 
not only would the statements fall within a hearsay exception, but any 
defendant interested in confronting the declarant of the statements would 
 
32 See, e.g., United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 525 (9th Cir. 1991). 
33 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980). 
34 948 F.2d at 525–26. 
35 Id. at 525–28. 
36 Id. at 524. 
37 Id. at 525. 
38 Id. at 525–26. 
39 Id. at 526. 
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have the opportunity to do so, because the declarant would be the defendant 
himself.40 
The court first analogized to another category of third-party statements 
already attributed to criminal defendants—adoptive admissions.41  An 
adoptive admission is a statement that a defendant does not make but 
manifests that she adopts it or believes it to be true.42  Quoting the Sixth 
Circuit, the court explained that adoptive admissions “avoid[] the 
confrontation problem because the words of the hearsay become the words 
of the defendant.”43  According to the Sixth Circuit, adoptive admission 
constitutes a “special indicium of reliability” that removes the need for 
confrontation.44 
The Ninth Circuit subsequently described two then-current trends in 
federal courts grappling with this issue.  First, the court referenced several 
rulings from other circuits in which they treated interpreters as agents of the 
defendants.45  Like adoptive admissions, admissions by an agent of a 
defendant fall within an exclusion to the hearsay rule46 and are therefore 
attributable directly to the defendant for the purpose of Confrontation 
Clause analysis.47  Second, the court referred to rulings where statements 
were attributed directly to the defendants by treating the interpreters as 
“language conduit[s].”48  Under this language conduit theory, accurate 
interpretation by an individual with no motive to mislead or distort does not 
create a layer of hearsay.49  Instead, testimony about those statements falls 
“within the same exception to the hearsay rule as when a defendant and 
another are speaking the same language.”50 
The Ninth Circuit then discussed the practical difficulties of adopting a 
rule requiring an alternate solution—that in each criminal investigation 
requiring a translator, the translator must either be appointed by the court or 
 
40 Id. at 525–26. 
41 Id. at 526. 
42 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B); see also United States v. McKinney, 707 F.2d 381, 
384 (9th Cir. 1983). 
43 Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 526 (quoting Poole v. Perini, 659 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 1981) 
(internal quotation mark omitted)). 
44 Poole, 659 F.2d at 733. 
45 See Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 526 (citations omitted). 
46 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D). 
47 Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 526. 
48 Id. (quoting United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129, 1135 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
49 See Koskerides, 877 F.2d at 1135. 
50 United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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provided by the defendant.51  The latter solution might have lent more 
credibility to the theory that the translator is an agent of the defendant, but 
the court rejected the approach.52  The court voiced a concern about creating 
“a largely arbitrary distinction” between criminal defendants based on each 
defendant’s language ability and access to a translator.53  The court also 
noted that the impact on undercover investigations would be burdensome 
on police, whereas translation “in the course of an . . . interrogation 
following arrest” could be recorded or achieved by a translator at trial.54 
Embracing an approach based on the agency and language conduit 
theories,55 the Nazemian court held that the differentiation between 
language conduits (interpreters not subject to confrontation) and 
interpreter–declarants (interpreters subject to confrontation) must be based 
on four relevant factors previously discussed by other circuits.56  First, a 
court may consider which party supplied the interpreter.57  Second, the court 
may take into account any motivation the interpreter may have had to 
distort the conversation or mislead the parties.58  Third, the court may 
analyze the interpreter’s language skill along with any qualifications.59  
Fourth, the court may investigate whether any acts following the 
conversation were consistent with the translated statements.60  When the 
relevant factors show that the interpreter acted as an agent of the defendant 
or as a language conduit, the defendant may be the declarant of the 
interpreted statements.61  Therefore, the statements can generally be 
 
51 Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 526–27.  This potential solution to the translator hearsay 
problem came from an earlier Ninth Circuit opinion holding the “agency-language-conduit 
theory” to be inapplicable in a case where the translator was a guard at a prison camp at 
which the defendant was incarcerated.  United States v. Felix-Jerez, 667 F.2d 1297, 1300 n.1 
(9th Cir. 1982). 
52 Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 527. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 527 n.7. 
55 The Ninth Circuit panel in Orm Hieng explained that Nazemian created the analytical 
framework for differentiating between interpreter–declarants and language conduits.  See 
United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2012).  However, Nazemian 
adopted a hybrid of the agency theory and language conduit theory that predated it.  
Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 527–28 (discussing “factors which may be relevant [to] . . . agency or 
conduit theory” and concluding that the district court could have treated the interpreter “as a 
mere language conduit or as Nazemian’s agent”). 





61 Id. at 528. 
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admitted without consideration of the Confrontation Clause or any related 
hearsay problem. 
II. MODERN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
Thirteen years after Nazemian, the Supreme Court reexamined the 
Confrontation Clause with the first of a series of cases that has altered that 
constitutional landscape.  Overturning Ohio v. Roberts,62 the Court in 
Crawford v. Washington and its progeny spawned thousands of discussions 
based on a criminal defendant’s right to face her accuser.63  The Supreme 
Court has used these cases, in part, to divorce Confrontation Clause analysis 
from hearsay analysis by no longer making hearsay analysis dispositive of 
Confrontation Clause questions.  The Supreme Court has also modified the 
category of evidence that implicates the Confrontation Clause.  The shift in 
the connection between the Confrontation Clause and the law of evidence 
that governs hearsay analysis, as well as the modern application of the 
Confrontation Clause to forensic analysis and child testimony, provides 
insight to the question of a defendant’s right to confront the interpreter 
present at his police interrogation.  This Part examines four recent Supreme 
Court decisions, starting with Crawford, that shape the area of 
constitutional law relevant to Judge Berzon’s concurrence in Orm Hieng. 
A. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 
The issue in Crawford v. Washington stemmed from the trial court’s 
decision to admit the defendant’s wife’s out-of-court statements without 
allowing the defendant to confront his wife through cross-examination.64  
Prior to the grant of certiorari, courts applied the then-controlling test from 
Ohio v. Roberts and reached conflicting opinions regarding the statements’ 
admissibility under the Confrontation Clause.65  Rather than provide a more 
detailed definition of the Roberts test, the Supreme Court reconsidered the 
text and the history of the Confrontation Clause.66  That reconsideration 
 
62 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2003). 
63 As of October 21, 2013, Westlaw lists 36,712 sources that cite Crawford. 
64 541 U.S. 36, 38–40 (2004). 
65 See id. at 40–41.  The State of Washington trial court originally admitted the 
testimony.  Id. at 40.  On appeal, the state appellate court reversed, but that ruling was 
reversed again by the Washington State Supreme Court.  Id. at 41.  Each court tested the 
reliability of the statements per Roberts’s instruction but disagreed as to the sufficiency of 
the statement’s reliability.  Id. at 40–41. 
66 Id. at 42–56. 
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formed the basis of a new test for a defendant’s right to confrontation—an 
analysis of the testimonial nature of the statements to be admitted.67 
In considering the genesis and history of the Confrontation Clause, the 
Supreme Court examined the evils the Sixth Amendment was designed to 
confront.68  The Court described the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, an 
Englishman convicted of treason on the weight of a damning letter written 
by an alleged accomplice.69  The Court also discussed practices in the early 
eighteenth century American colonies, where admiralty courts refused 
defendants the right to confrontation, a practice that sparked protests from 
colonial representatives and defense lawyers alike.70  In addition, the Court 
considered the reaction to the Constitution, as it was originally ratified, 
without a right to confrontation.71  The Court noted that “the principal evil 
at which the Confrontation Clause was directed” was the threat of 
convictions based on ex parte evidence—an objectionable judicial practice 
that Raleigh described as reminiscent of the Spanish Inquisition.72 
The Court’s historical analysis led it to two conclusions: first, that 
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause must be guided by the desire to 
avoid procedures that allow admission of the type of ex parte evidence 
admitted against Sir Walter Raleigh; and second, that the evidence thus 
barred could only be allowed based on a finding that the declarant was both 
unable to testify at trial and had previously been made available for cross-
examination.73  The Court expounded on the first of those conclusions in 
two ways.  The Court first rejected the notion that the law of evidence was 
strong enough to protect defendants from the sort of evidence that 
compelled the adoption of the Confrontation Clause.74  Instead, the Court 
created a new categorization of statements—testimonial and 
nontestimonial.75  Although the Court did not directly define these two 
 
67 Id. at 53–54, 59, 68. 
68 Id. at 43–50. 
69 Id. at 44.  The letter was read at trial, where Raleigh demanded that the author, Lord 
Cobham,  be brought to face him in public.  Id.  Raleigh suspected that Cobham would not 
be able to repeat the alleged lies that he had written in the letter if he was required to do so in 
person in front of a judge and jury.  Id.  The judges did not allow Raleigh to call Cobham 
into court, and Raleigh was sentenced to death.  Id. 
70 Id. at 47–48. 
71 Id. at 48–49. 
72 Id. at 49–50. 
73 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50–51, 53–54. 
74 Id. at 51 (“Leaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence 
would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant 
inquisitorial practices.”). 
75 Id. at 51, 68. 
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categories,76 it provided guidelines for lower courts in making the 
distinction.  Those guidelines included three viable definitions as well as a 
list of types of statements that “at a minimum” must be considered to be 
testimonial: “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, 
or at a former trial; and [] police interrogations.”77 
The second way the Court expounded on the goal to avoid inquisitorial 
procedures was by explicitly rejecting the approach taken by Ohio v. 
Roberts.78  The Court determined that the Roberts standard was at once too 
broad and too narrow.  It applied to both testimonial and nontestimonial 
statements but failed to exclude certain testimonial ex parte statements.79  
The majority was especially troubled by Roberts’s holding that the 
Confrontation Clause could be satisfied by a “mere judicial determination 
of reliability.”80  The Court found the Roberts standard to be “amorphous,” 
“subjective,” and “unpredictable.”81  Most importantly, the Court was able 
to identify a long list of instances in which “statements that the 
Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude” were admitted at trial under 
the Roberts test.82  Such a result was unacceptable to the Crawford Court, 
and it overruled Roberts.83 
Having identified the class of statements to which the Confrontation 
Clause was intended to apply and having rejected the Roberts reliability test 
as unreliable, the Court affirmed the necessity of cross-examining 
testimonial declarants: “Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only 
indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one 
the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”84  With that concluding 
remark, Crawford punctuated its landmark shift from allowing courts to 
 
76 A significant portion of the debate generated by Crawford has been based on the 
(in)adequacy of the Court’s definition of testimonial statements.  See, e.g., Cicchini, supra 
note 9, at 1308–10; Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of “Testimonial,” 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 241, 273–74 (2005). 
77 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
78 Id. at 60. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 62. 
81 Id. at 63.  The Court stressed the notion of subjectivity by providing examples of 
lower court opinions in which “opposite” situations caused those courts to find the 
statements more reliable in each case.  Id. 
82 Id. at 63–65.  The majority specifically noted that courts had admitted accomplice 
confessions that implicated defendants, plea allocutions acknowledging conspiracies, grand 
jury testimony, and prior trial testimony. 
83 Id. at 67–69. 
84 Id. at 68–69. 
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apply hearsay principles and reliability determinations to giving defendants 
an immutable right to confront any testimonial declarant. 
B. DAVIS V. WASHINGTON 
In 2006, the Supreme Court began to refine its definition of testimonial 
statements when it granted certiorari to a pair of cases that tested the 
testimonial nature of statements made during police interrogation.85  The 
resulting decision, Davis v. Washington, altered the Crawford analysis by 
establishing the primary purpose test—the notion that the testimonial nature 
of a statement may be determined by questioning whether the statement was 
made with criminal prosecution in mind.86  Although the Court was careful 
not to restrict the definition of “testimonial” to a pure analysis of a 
statement’s purpose, Davis began moving the definition away from 
Crawford’s original set of unclear potential definitions. 
Davis analyzed the admissibility of two conversations related to 
domestic abuse cases.87  In the first conversation, Michelle McCottry, the 
ex-girlfriend of one defendant, spoke with a 911 operator.88  In the second 
conversation, Amy Hammon, the wife of the other defendant, spoke with 
police who arrived at her home in response to a domestic disturbance 
report.89  Both women’s statements were admitted in state court based on 
findings that they were nontestimonial.90  The Davis Court acknowledged 
that the nature of both statements was “not as clear” as the statements made 
in response to police interrogation in Crawford and set out the following 
rule: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when 
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and 
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.91 
 
85 Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 457–59 (Ind. 2005), cert. granted, 546 U.S. 976 
(2005); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 849–51 (Wash. 2005), cert. granted, 546 U.S. 975 
(2005). 
86 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); see also Rebecca K. Connally, 
“Out of the Mouth[s] of Babes”: Can Young Children Even Bear Testimony?, ARMY LAW., 
Mar. 2008, at 1, 13; Christopher Cannon Funk, Note, The Reasonable Child Declarant After 
Davis v. Washington, 61 STAN. L. REV. 923, 935 (2009); Grimm, supra note 8, at 190–91. 
87 547 U.S. at 817, 819. 
88 Id. at 817. 
89 Id. at 819. 
90 Id. at 819, 821. 
91 Id. at 822. 
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That rule, referred to as the “primary purpose” test, did not limit the 
range of testimonial statements to those statements made in response to 
police interrogation, but the Court did state in dicta that analysis should 
focus on the declarant’s intent when making the statement rather than the 
questioner’s purpose.92  Although the primary purpose test helped clarify 
the testimonial nature of a limited set of statements, the Davis Court made it 
clear that such a test was not an attempt to classify all potential statements 
or even all statements made in police interrogations.93  Based on that rule, 
the Court held that McCottry’s statement, made during an ongoing 
emergency, was nontestimonial and therefore admissible.94  However, 
Hammon’s statements were made during an interrogation during which no 
such emergency existed.95  Those statements were properly classified as 
testimonial and should have been excluded by the trial court.96 
The Court also revisited the relationship between the law of evidence 
and the Confrontation Clause analysis.  Davis considered the potential 
cooling effect that a confrontation right could have on potential witnesses—
an especially relevant concern in domestic violence cases, where defendants 
can exert significant influence over alleged victims.97  The Court held that 
the right to confrontation does not abrogate a defendant’s duty to maintain 
“the integrity of the criminal-trial system.”98  The Court refused to 
enumerate a standard for the showing of wrongdoing required to 
“extinguish[] confrontation claims” but noted a trend in lower courts of 
referring to the law of evidence and adopting a preponderance of the 
evidence standard.99  Such a use of the law of evidence relative to 
Confrontation Clause analysis had been considered and accepted by 
Crawford because “it does not purport to be an alternative means of 
determining reliability.”100  Davis’s reliance on Crawford’s line between 
 
92 See id. at 822 n.1.  Despite the Court’s emphasis on the declarant’s intent, lower courts 
responded to Davis’s formulation of the primary purpose test by focusing on the questioner’s 
intent in at least one area of law—statements made to police by children who allege sexual 
abuse.  See Funk, supra note 86, at 940–43 (“In general, if a court decided that the primary-
purpose test applied to a child declarant’s statement, the child’s statement would almost 
always be testimonial because child abuse victims rarely, if ever, made statements during an 
ongoing emergency to law enforcement officials or their agents.”). 
93 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
94 Id. at 827–28. 
95 Id. at 829–32. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 832–33. 
98 Id. at 833. 
99 Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59 (1878))). 
100 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158–59). 
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acceptable and unacceptable use of the law of evidence reaffirmed the new 
relationship between Confrontation Clause doctrine and hearsay doctrine. 
C. MELENDEZ-DIAZ V. MASSACHUSETTS 
Following Crawford and Davis, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and, finding in favor of the defendant–
appellant, placed limits on the definition of nontestimonial statements.101  
The Court held that a forensic analysis prepared as evidence in a criminal 
trial is testimonial and therefore subject to the Confrontation Clause.102  In 
doing so, Melendez-Diaz limited the rationale that lower courts had used to 
hold statements as nontestimonial; specifically, it explicitly rejected several 
arguments presented by the State: (1) the analysts were not accusatory and 
therefore did not produce testimonial statements; (2) the analysts were not 
providing testimony based on past perception and therefore did not produce 
testimonial statements; (3) the analysts performed neutral analysis which 
could not be classified as testimonial; (4) the reports that were produced 
were business records and therefore nontestimonial; and (5) the defendant’s 
ability to subpoena the analysts fulfilled the requirements of 
confrontation.103  In affirmatively finding the report to be testimonial in 
nature and  rejecting the arguments for classifying it as nontestimonial, the 
Court limited the classification of other nontestimonial statements. 
The Court emphatically placed forensic reports “within the ‘core class 
of testimonial statements’” that had been developed by Crawford.104  The 
Court referred back to Crawford’s inclusion of affidavits in its list of 
testimonial statements and determined that the reports “quite plainly” fit the 
Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “affidavits.”105  The Court noted that 
the reports were “incontrovertibly a ‘solemn declaration or affirmation 
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact’”106 and 
described the functional equivalence between the reports and live 
testimony.107  Without direct reference to Davis, the Court also discussed 
 
101 557 U.S. 305, 309–11 (2009). 
102 Id. at 308, 310, 329. 
103 Id. at 313, 315, 317, 321, 324. 
104 Id. at 310 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).  Not only was the language of the 
Court’s affirmative argument emphatic, but in discussing the various counterarguments 
presented by the State, the Court referred to its holding as a “rather straightforward 
application of . . . Crawford,” further reinforcing its holding and discounting the State’s 
claims.  Id. at 312. 
105 Id. at 310.  The Court made note of the fact that affidavits were mentioned twice by 
Crawford when describing categories of testimonial statements.  Id. 
106 Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). 
107 Id. at 310–11 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)). 
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the purpose of the reports “to provide ‘prima facie evidence’ . . . of the 
analyzed substance” and held that, because the purpose of the reports “was 
reprinted on the affidavits themselves,” the analysts knew of that purpose, 
clearly implicating Davis’s primary purpose test.108 
Following its holding that the forensic reports were properly classified 
as testimonial, the Court continued by finding the State’s “potpourri” of 
arguments unpersuasive.109  The Court first addressed the argument that 
there is no constitutional right to confront forensic analysts who “do not 
directly accuse [the defendant] of wrongdoing . . . .”110  The Court held that 
the Sixth Amendment separates all witnesses into two categories—either 
for or against a defendant.111  Because forensic analysts provide evidence 
against a criminal defendant, they must fall into the latter category, 
regardless of their nonaccusatory nature.112 
The State’s second argument was that there is no constitutional right to 
confront witnesses who are not “conventional.”113  The Court considered 
three ways in which forensic reports may be described as unconventional.114  
First, forensic reports are observations made near the time of an analysis, 
rather than recollections of past events.115  However, the Court noted that 
Davis exercised the right to confrontation based on statements made near 
the time of the act being described, discounting the effect of a statement’s 
timing on its testimonial nature.116  Second, forensic analysts do not 
personally witness a crime or any acts related to a crime.117  The Court 
dismissed this distinction as unfounded, using an example of a police 
officer providing testimonial statements about a crime scene that had been 
investigated.118  Third, forensic reports are not prepared as answers to police 
interrogations.119  The Court reiterated its previous holding in both 
Crawford and Davis that a statement need not be a response to interrogation 
to be testimonial and then pointed out that the forensic reports at issue had 
 
108 Id. at 311 (quoting MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 111, § 13 (LexisNexis 2004)). 
109 Id. at 312. 
110 Id. at 313. 
111 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI) (contrasting the Confrontation Clause with the 
Compulsory Process Clause, which guarantees a defendant the right to call witnesses to 
support his defense). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 315. 
114 Id. at 315–17. 
115 Id. at 315. 
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been prepared in response to a police request.120  Not only did the Court 
reaffirm the rule that statements not made during interrogation could be 
testimonial, but it broadened the concept of interrogation to expressly 
include a “response to a police officer’s request to ‘write down what 
happened’” as well as a police request for forensic reports.121 
The third argument the Court addressed was the claim that forensic 
reports should not be subject to the Confrontation Clause because they are 
the product of neutral, mechanical testing by people who would not be 
inclined to change their opinion if forced to testify in the presence of the 
accused.122  The Court rejected both the argument’s premise that the testing 
done could be absolutely neutrally and the conclusion that a factor other 
than confrontation could weigh on the admissibility of a testimonial 
statement.123  The Court considered that the State could “be right that there 
are other ways—and in some cases better ways—to challenge or verify the 
results of a forensic test,” but held firm that “the Constitution guarantees 
one way: confrontation.”124  Finally, the Court clearly held that no amount 
of reliability could circumvent the right to confrontation when dealing with 
testimonial statements.  Also, questioning the assumption that the testing 
was neutral and reliable, the Court pointed to the use of the Confrontation 
Clause in “weed[ing] out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the 
incompetent one as well.”125  Although the Court recognized that the 
analysts followed standard methods, it identified that “some of that 
methodology requires the exercise of judgment and presents a risk of error 
that might be explored on cross-examination.”126 
The State’s fourth argument was that forensic reports are similar to 
business records and therefore are not subject to the Confrontation 
Clause.127  Similar to the way it repudiated the previous analysis, the Court 
rejected the argument forcefully.128  The Court held that forensic reports, 
like police reports, are expressly removed from the category of business 
records in the law of evidence because they are created for use in court.129  
 
120 Id. at 316–17. 
121 Id. at 317 (citations omitted). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 317–18. 
124 Id. at 318. 
125 Id. at 319. 
126 Id. at 320 (citing 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE § 23.03[c], at 532–33 (4th ed. 2007); James M. Shellow, The Application of Daubert 
to the Identification of Drugs, 2 SHEPARD’S EXPERT & SCI. EVIDENCE Q. 593, 600 (1995)). 
127 Id. at 321. 
128 Id. at 321–22. 
129 See id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(6), (8)). 
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The Court then revisited Crawford to reaffirm the separation of 
Confrontation Clause analysis and the law of evidence: 
Respondent also misunderstands the relationship between the business-and-official-
records hearsay exceptions and the Confrontation Clause. . . .  Business and public 
records are generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify under 
an exception to the hearsay rules, but because—having been created for the 
administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving 
some fact at trial—they are not testimonial.  Whether or not they qualify as business 
or official records, the analysts’ statements here—prepared specifically for use at 
petitioner’s trial—were testimony against petitioner . . . .130 
By rejecting the use of hearsay exceptions as alternatives to ensuring 
reliability through confrontation the Court, as it did in Davis, reaffirmed the 
relationship between Confrontation Clause analysis and the law of 
evidence.131 
The fifth argument the Court addressed was the claim that the 
defendant’s ability to subpoena the forensic analysts satisfied the right to 
confrontation.132  Here, the Court found that the power to subpoena a 
witness does not fulfill the prosecution’s affirmative obligation to present 
its witnesses for cross-examination.133 
Beyond simply holding that forensic reports are testimonial, Melendez-
Diaz shaped Confrontation Clause doctrine by limiting the rationale under 
which statements can be found to be nontestimonial.  Just because a 
statement is nonaccusatory, unusual, or supposedly neutral, does not 
remove it from the class of statements that require confrontation.134  Instead, 
the Court remained focused on the purpose of the statement—whether it 
was made to be used against the accused as evidence at trial.135  This 
question of purpose guided the Court’s opinion in Melendez-Diaz, which 
ultimately classified forensic reports as testimonial.136 
D. BULLCOMING V. NEW MEXICO 
Two years after Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court issued its opinion 
in Bullcoming v. New Mexico.137  Bullcoming expanded the holding of 
Melendez-Diaz by considering the use of surrogate testimony, that is, 
 




134 Id. at 315–17. 
135 Id. at 324. 
136 Id. at 310. 
137 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
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testimony (including cross-examination) from an analyst who was not 
directly involved in creating the forensic report being offered, but who was 
familiar with the procedure.138  Bullcoming held that the use of surrogate 
witnesses removed from the actual analysis did not fulfill the requirements 
of the Confrontation Clause.139  Bullcoming also bolstered the Court’s 
holding in Melendez-Diaz by rejecting more State arguments for 
categorizing the forensic analysis at issue as nontestimonial.140 
Bullcoming first expanded the Court’s Confrontation Clause doctrine 
by explaining why cross-examining the surrogate witness at issue did not 
fulfill the requirement of the Clause.141  The New Mexico Supreme Court 
had allowed the surrogate witness to testify in a felony drug case because it 
concluded that the analyst only presented the results generated by the 
machine used to identify the compound’s component substances and did not 
interpret those results or exercise any independent judgment.142  However, 
in its review of the analyst’s testimony, the Supreme Court pointed out 
remarks about receiving a blood sample, the type of test used and what 
procedures were followed by the analyst who performed it, and the lack of 
any factor that affected the results of the analysis.143  Rejecting the 
suitability of the surrogate witness, the Court analogized the analyst’s report 
to a police report recording the address on the door of a house or the speed 
that popped up on a radar gun reading, holding that the Confrontation 
Clause required more than the availability of any police officer familiar 
with the technology and methodology of gathering that information for the 
report.144  The Court expressed a specific interest in ensuring the right to 
confrontation for the purpose of conveying what the declarant “knew or 
observed about the events” that generated the testimony and “expos[ing] 
any lapses or lies on the certifying analyst’s part.”145  In the opinion of the 
Court, cross-examining an analyst who had no firsthand knowledge of the 
analysis in question could not satisfy the demands of the Confrontation 
Clause.146 
 
138 Id. at 2711–12. 
139 Id. at 2713. 
140 Id. at 2714–17. 
141 Id. at 2714–16. 
142 Id. at 2714. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 2714–15. 
145 Id. at 2715.  The specific language the Court chose, “lapses or lies,” recalls the holding 
of Melendez-Diaz, which described “weed[ing] out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the 
incompetent one as well.”  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009). 
146 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2713. 
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The Court also rejected arguments for classifying the analysis as 
nontestimonial.147  Citing Melendez-Diaz, the Court dismissed claims that 
the analysis was not necessarily subject to confrontation because it was not 
adversarial.148  The Court also rejected an argument that the analysis was 
nontestimonial because, unlike the analysis in Melendez-Diaz, it had not 
been “sworn to before a notary public.”149  Citing portions of Crawford and 
Davis that had foreseen such an argument and rejected it, the Court refused 
to accept that the right to confrontation would be so “easily erasable.”150 
Relying heavily on Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming was not a drastic 
addition to, or departure from, the groundwork that the three cases 
discussed previously had laid.  However, it did serve to reinforce the 
Supreme Court’s stance regarding forensic analysis, and it furthered the 
exploration of the testimonial nature of scientific testing by relying on a 
rigorous evaluation of the nonmechanical contents of the analysis. 
III. ORM HIENG’S ANALYSIS OF POLICE INTERPRETER STATEMENTS’ 
ADMISSIBILITY 
A. MAJORITY’S TREATMENT OF NAZEMIAN POST-CRAWFORD 
In Orm Hieng, the Ninth Circuit faced a challenge to Nazemian based 
on Crawford and its companion cases.151  The Ninth Circuit panel, in 
determining whether Nazemian had been overruled, analyzed whether the 
Crawford line of cases had “undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the 
prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly 
irreconcilable.”152 
The three-judge panel first distinguished between the thrust of the 
Crawford cases and the holding of Nazemian.  The Crawford cases focused 
on the testimonial–nontestimonial distinction, where testimonial statements 
must be subject to confrontation.153  The threshold determination of to 
whom an interpreted statement must be attributed was not directly 
 
147 Id. at 2716–17. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 2717 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
150 Id. 
151 United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Hieng argues that 
Nazemian has been overruled by Crawford v. Washington and its progeny.” (citation 
omitted)). 
152 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
153 Id. at 1140. 
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addressed by any of the Crawford cases.154  Therefore, only if the language 
of the Crawford cases made that threshold determination clearly 
irreconcilable with current doctrine would the panel have been able to set 
Nazemian aside. 
The court held that the Crawford cases did not clearly imply that 
Nazemian’s threshold determination was invalid.155  The panel conceded 
that Nazemian’s test stems from the law of evidence but held that the 
Crawford cases “provide no clear guide with respect to the interplay, if any, 
between the Confrontation Clause and the law of evidence.”156  Although 
the panel considered that “Crawford might be read as essentially divorcing 
Sixth Amendment analysis from the law of evidence,” it held that based on 
repeated references to the law of evidence within Crawford and Davis such 
a divorce was not clear enough to find clear irreconcilability.157  According 
to the Orm Hieng panel, the standard of clear irreconcilability was too high 
a bar for the language of the Crawford court to satisfy.158 
B. JUDGE BERZON’S CONCURRENCE 
Judge Berzon’s concurrence did not directly attack the majority’s 
reasoning, because she agreed that a three-judge panel lacked the 
appropriate authority to decide the issue.159  However, the judge’s argument 
pressed for en banc review of Nazemian’s continued application post-
Crawford.160  The Ninth Circuit procedural rules would allow such a review 
to confront the Orm Hieng majority’s reasoning with a higher level of 
scrutiny than a three-judge panel would bring to bear, changing the analysis 
from “clear irreconcilability” to a more searching treatment of preemption 
by Crawford doctrine.161 
In support and anticipation of en banc review, Judge Berzon offered 
two arguments that the Crawford line of cases overruled Nazemian.  First, 
she briefly alluded to Nazemian’s reliance on “unity between hearsay 
 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 1141. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 1140–41. 
158 Id. at 1139, 1141. 
159 Id. at 1145 (Berzon, J., concurring) (“I agree with the opinion’s conclusion that 
United States v. Nazemian is not so ‘clearly irreconcilable’ with Crawford v. Washington as 
to permit a three-judge panel to overrule Nazemian . . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
160 Id. 
161 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, when sitting en banc, has discretion over the 
standard of review it applies.  Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 
F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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concepts and Confrontation Clause analysis” that was no longer valid.162  
Second, she identified tension between Nazemian’s implicit trust in the 
accuracy and independence of interpreters and the Crawford cases’ scrutiny 
of forensic reports.163  Although neither argument indicated a clear 
irreconcilability between Nazemian and the Crawford cases to the panel, 
both arguments provide strong support for a future en banc finding that 
Nazemian is no longer good law post-Crawford. 
1. Nazemian’s Reliance on an Outdated “Unity Between Hearsay Concepts 
and Confrontation Clause Analysis” 
The argument that Nazemian has been overruled because of its reliance 
on an outdated connection between hearsay law and Confrontation Clause 
doctrine can be broken into two analytical questions: (1) Was the holding 
related to the Confrontation Clause in Nazemian premised on the law of 
evidence?; and (2) have the Crawford cases made the Confrontation Clause 
independent from whatever evidentiary principles Nazemian relied on, such 
that testimony that meets the evidentiary requirements does not necessarily 
meet the Confrontation Clause requirements?  The nature of the language 
suggests that the answer to both questions is yes, and further suggests that 
modern Confrontation Clause doctrine is too divorced from the evidentiary 
principles that formed the foundation of Nazemian’s holding for the 
rationale used in Nazemian to persist as valid law. 
a. Nazemian’s Reliance on the Law of Evidence 
By adopting agency theory, language conduit theory, and analogizing 
to adoptive admissions, Nazemian relies on evidentiary principles.  All 
three of these doctrines, each of which applied to Confrontation Clause 
analysis under Roberts, can be linked to the law of evidence. 
Agency theory was one of the two theories that Nazemian explicitly 
hybridized into its test to determine the source of interpreted statements.164 
Agency theory provides that interpreters are in fact agents of the criminal 
defendant being interrogated, so long as the interpreter is capable and has 
no reason to falsify a translation.165  Therefore, under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, any of the interpreter’s statements are attributable to the 
 
162 Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1149. 
163 Id. 
164 See United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 526–28 (9th Cir. 1991). 
165 United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 831–32 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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defendant and do not qualify as hearsay.166  Although the agency theory did 
not form the entire basis of Nazemian’s test, it remains part of the Nazemian 
analysis and carries with it a direct connection to evidentiary principles. 
Nazemian also adopted the language conduit theory.167  Language 
conduit theory is a common law construction that allows a court to attribute 
a translated statement to the non-English speaker, rather than the interpreter, 
when the interpreter acted only as a “language conduit.”168  Although not 
directly connected to the law of evidence, language conduit theory shares 
the principles of agency theory and informs courts that adopt agency theory 
by allowing them to attribute statements directly to a defendant.169  As with 
agency theory, factors related to the interpreter’s reliability play a role in 
the determination of whether that interpreter is a language conduit.170  That 
language conduit theory was essentially similar to agency theory suggests 
that it was at least implicitly connected to the law of evidence. 
Nazemian also analogized its holding to the doctrine of adoptive 
admission.171  Adoptive admission allows a court to attribute a third-party 
statement to a criminal defendant who affirmatively adopted that statement 
as her own.172  Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, such an adoption falls 
within the same set of hearsay exclusions that exclude statements by a 
party’s agent.173  That attribution then qualifies as a “special indici[um] of 
reliability” that obviates the right to confrontation.174  Like Nazemian’s 
language conduits, adoptive admission “avoid[s] the confrontation problem 
because the words of the hearsay become the words of the defendant.”175  
 
166 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) (explaining that statements by a defendant’s agent are 
not hearsay). 
167 See Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 526–28. 
168 Language conduit theory stems from a per curiam opinion by the Ninth Circuit that 
did not provide a method for differentiating between language conduits and other 
interpreters.  See United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1973) (per 
curiam). 
169 See United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129, 1135 (2d Cir. 1989); Da Silva, 725 
F.2d at 832. 
170 See Koskerides, 877 F.2d at 1135. 
171 Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 526. 
172 Poole v. Perini, 659 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 1981).  For example, imagine a 
defendant, Smith, is told “your buddy Jones says you two had been watching the bank every 
day at 8:00 a.m. for the week leading up to the heist.”  If Smith responds, “yeah,” then at 
trial the prosecutor may introduce Jones’s statement as Smith’s own statement—not simply 
the “yeah” that Smith actually said. 
173 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B), (D). 
174 Perini, 659 F.2d at 733. 
175 Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 526 (quoting Perini, 659 F.2d at 733) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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Like agency theory, adoptive admission is directly based on the law of 
evidence. 
Each of the three principles that formed the basis of Nazemian’s 
holding—agency theory, language conduit theory, and adoptive 
admission—connect, at least implicitly, to the law of evidence.  All three 
doctrines conform to hearsay exclusions that attribute third-party statements 
to a party involved in the case.  The majority in Orm Hieng accepted as 
much, saying that “[o]ur threshold inquiry in Nazemian . . . stems from 
principles of the law of evidence.”176 
 b. Crawford’s Separation of Confrontation and Hearsay 
Less clear to the Orm Hieng court was the new relationship between 
the Confrontation Clause analysis and the law of evidence.177  However, the 
language of the Crawford cases strongly suggests that, whatever the exact 
relationship between the two may be, the law of evidence as relied upon by 
Nazemian should no longer prejudice a defendant’s right to confrontation. 
In several instances, Crawford indicated that the relationship between 
the law of evidence and the Confrontation Clause analysis that existed 
under Roberts needed to change.  Crawford “reject[ed] the view that the 
[application of the] Confrontation Clause . . . to out-of-court statements 
introduced at trial depends upon ‘the law of Evidence for the time 
being.’”178  Crawford explained that Roberts’s flaw was its acceptance of 
“the vagaries of the rules of evidence” and “amorphous notions of 
‘reliability’” in the face of the Constitution’s requirement that defendants be 
able to confront testimonial witnesses, and the Court held that no such 
doctrine could “be a surrogate means of assessing reliability” of testimonial 
statements.179  However, Crawford did not wholly remove the law of 
evidence from Confrontation Clause analysis; it held that evidentiary rules 
that “[do] not purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability” 
may still create exceptions to the Confrontation Clause.180 
 
176 United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012). 
177 Id. at 1141 (“[T]he Court’s recent Confrontation Clause cases provide no clear guide 
with respect to the interplay, if any, between the Confrontation Clause and the law of 
evidence.”). 
178 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50–51 (2004) (quoting 3 JOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF 
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA § 1397, at 101 (2d ed. 1923)) (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 
U.S. 74, 94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
179 Id. at 61–62. 
180 Id. at 62. 
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This distinction between applicable evidentiary doctrine and 
inapplicable doctrine, although not fully examined, has remained valid 
through the cases that followed Crawford.  Davis reiterated the applicability 
of the rule of forfeiture, which is codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(6).181  Melendez-Diaz separated the general Confrontation Clause 
classification of business and public records as nontestimonial statements 
from the evidentiary application of business and public record hearsay 
exceptions, making it clear that even if the hearsay exception should apply, 
such an indication of reliability would not resolve the confrontation issue.182 
Based on the Court’s holding that the law of evidence cannot supply 
an alternative means of determining a statement’s reliability for the purpose 
of Confrontation Clause analysis, Nazemian’s holding is invalid.  
Nazemian’s application of the law of evidence is “an alternative means of 
determining reliability.”183  Statements admissible under Nazemian are 
reliable because an agent of the defendant or a language conduit for the 
defendant makes them, allowing the law of evidence to impute the 
statement to the defendant.  It is only that determination, based on the law 
of evidence, which allows courts to impute an interpreter’s statements to a 
defendant and avoid the requirement of permitting the defendant to confront 
that person.  Furthermore, the doctrine to which Nazemian analogized its 
holding, adoptive admissions, is used expressly as a method for finding 
“special indicia of reliability which would justify an exception to the 
requirement of cross-examination.”184  Such indicia could get around the 
Confrontation Clause under Roberts, but not so under Crawford.  The 
evidentiary law rules established by the basis of Nazemian’s Confrontation 
Clause analysis thus conflict with the Crawford cases and should be 
declared invalid. 
2. Tension Between Nazemian and the Treatment of Forensic Reports 
Judge Berzon’s next claim relied on a comparison between forensic 
analysis and interpretation.  Judge Berzon argued: 
  
 
181 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006); see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).  
The rule of forfeiture denies the right of confrontation to a defendant who wrongly prevents 
a witness from appearing at trial.  See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 366–68 (2008). 
182 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009). 
183 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. 
184 Poole v. Perini, 659 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 1981). 
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Translation from one language to another is much less of a science than conducting 
laboratory tests, and so much more subject to error and dispute.  Without the ability to 
confront the person who conducted the translation, a party cannot test the accuracy of 
the translation in the manner in which the Confrontation Clause contemplates.185 
Comparing those two disciplines in the context of the Crawford cases 
supports the conclusion that defendants should have the right to confront 
the interpreters of their statements during police investigation.  This is so, 
first, because interpretation is conducted both in response to police requests 
and for the purpose of gathering evidence against the accused; second, 
because confrontation is used to minimize the effect of incompetent and 
fraudulent interpreters; and third, because qualities of the interpreter are 
irrelevant to showing his reliability. 
Both Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming made clear that forensic analysis 
is subject to the right to confrontation.  The Court referenced how affidavits 
were included in the list of core testimonial statements,186 how the purpose 
of the forensic reports was to establish facts to be used at trial, and how 
similar the forensic reports were to live testimony.  Like forensic reports, 
interpretation for a police interrogation fits into a “core class of testimonial 
statements”—police interrogations.187  Also like forensic reports, the 
purpose of an interpretation is to establish facts that can be used at trial.  In 
addition, an interpreter’s statements are exactly what the police officer will 
be testifying to at the trial.  Based on these three key qualities of interpreter 
statements, an interpreter in a police interrogation should be subject to 
confrontation. 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming also discussed the importance of 
confrontation as a procedural tool that reveals and screens unreliable 
witnesses.188  No amount of safeguards within the field of interpretation is 
likely to eliminate all possibility of error or misrepresentation, and the 
Court, in the Crawford cases, has acknowledged the value that the 
Constitution places on face-to-face confrontation as a method of limiting 
that danger.  Just as confrontation of forensic analysts can “expose any 
lapses or lies,” confrontation of interpreters can do the same.189 
Finally, the factors that Nazemian relied upon to differentiate between 
language conduits and interpreter–declarants, as well as other factors that 
 
185 United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1149 (9th Cir. 2012) (Berzon, J., concurring). 
186 The Court made it clear that the forensic reports qualified as affidavits.  Melendez-
Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310. 
187 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 68 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
188 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318–21; Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 
2715–16 (2011). 
189 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715. 
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may have made lower courts more willing to admit interpreter statements, 
have been deemed irrelevant by the Crawford cases.  Alternative means of 
determining reliability—including considering which party supplied the 
interpreter, any motivation the interpreter may have had to distort the 
conversation or mislead the parties, the interpreter’s skill along with any 
qualifications, and whether any acts following the conversation were 
consistent with the translated statements—are all irrelevant under 
Crawford.190  Likewise, the perception that an interpreter is nonaccusatory, 
unusual, or neutral offers no escape from the Confrontation Clause.191  No 
language in the Crawford cases suggests that interpreters should fare any 
differently under the Confrontation Clause than do forensic analysts. 
CONCLUSION 
Non-English-speaking defendants who make statements to police 
through an interpreter face a frightening proposition.  As the Miranda 
warning indicates, anything they say can be used against them.  However, 
thanks to the language barrier, anything the defendants’ interpreters say, 
and not anything the defendants say, ends up being used against them.  The 
defendant must rely on that interpreter to navigate linguistic and cultural 
differences to deliver their words faithfully to the interrogating officer, and 
through that officer, to the American justice system. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to be 
confronted by the witnesses against them and has been interpreted to grant 
the right to confront any testimonial witness, explicitly including third 
parties who respond to police interrogations and forensic analysts, among 
others.  According to the Supreme Court, no indicia of reliability are 
enough to deny that right to confrontation so long as the witness’s 
statements are testimonial—adverse to the defendant and made for the 
purpose of providing evidence at trial.  The Ninth Circuit will likely be 
faced with a challenge to its twenty-year-old holding in Nazemian that 
interpreters need not be subjected to confrontation.  The court should take 
that opportunity to review the issue en banc and hold that the modern 
course of the Confrontation Clause doctrine has invalidated its precedent. 
 
 
190 See 541 U.S. at 61–62 (“[T]he Clause[] . . . commands, not that evidence be reliable, 
but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.”). 
191 See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313–21. 
